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Thirty years after the publication of Marr’s seminal book Vision (Marr, 1982) the papers
in this topic consider the contemporary status of his inWuential conception of three dis-
tinct levels of analysis for information processing systems, and in particular the role of
the algorithmic and representational level with its cognitive-level concepts. This level has
(either implicitly or explicitly) been downplayed or eliminated both by reductionist neuros-
cience approaches (from below) that seek to account for behaviour from the implementation
level and by Bayesian approaches (from above) that seek to account for behaviour in purely
computational-level terms.
Introduction
The origin of this topic is a symposium that took place
at the 34th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science So-
ciety in Sapporo in 2012. The aim of the symposium was
to acknowledge the 30th anniversary of David Marr’s land-
mark posthumous book Vision (Marr, 1982) and to take the
opportunity to consider the contemporary relevance of his
inWuential conception of three distinct levels of analysis for
information processing systems.
Marr’s “tri-level hypothesis” (Dawson, 1998), that in-
formation processing systems can be analysed in terms of
the problems that they solve (Marr’s computational level),
the representations and processes by which they solve them
(the algorithmic and representational level), and the physical
instantiation of these representations and processes (the
implementation level) has been reformulated several times
in the subsequent thirty years (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Newell,
1982; Pylyshyn, 1984) and remains a core tenet of cognitive
science.
Although Marr’s proposal is still widely accepted, the
rapid developments that have occurred in neuroscience and
Bayesian probabilistic analysis over the last decade have led
to a number of questions being raised concerning the relat-
ive value of the three levels of analysis and the relationships
between them. In particular, the role of the algorithmic and
representational level, with its cognitive-level concepts, has
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(either implicitly or explicitly) been downplayed or elim-
inated both by reductionist neuroscience approaches that
seek to account for behaviour without an algorithmic and
representation level distinct from the implementation level
(e.g., Bennett & Hacker, 2006) and by Bayesian approaches
that model cognition using probability theory (e.g., Grif-
Vths, Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2008; Oaksford & Chater, 2007).
This topic brings together eleven contributions that re-
examine the role of the algorithmic and representational
level in contemporary cognitive science. Five of those con-
tributions (Bechtel & Shagrir; Eliasmith & Kolbeck; Gray
Hardcastle & Hardcastle; GriXths, Lieder, & Goodman;
Love) are based on material presented in the symposium.
Six further contributuions (Anderson; Baggio, van Lam-
balgen & Hagoort; Bickle; Cooper & Peebles; French &
Thomas; Samuelson, Jenkins & Spencer) present perspect-
ives not covered at the Sapporo meeting. The resulting
papers represent a range of contemporary responses from
the main disciplines in cognitive science, including philo-
sophy (Bickle; Bechtel & Shagrir; Gray Hardcastle & Hard-
castle), cognitive neuroscience (Love; Baggio, van Lambal-
gen & Hagoort), cognitive modelling (Cooper & Peebles;
Love; French & Thomas), neural modelling (Eliasmith &
Kolbeck; Gray Hardcastle & Hardcastle), Bayesian model-
ling (GriXths, Lieder, & Goodman), dynamical systems the-
ory (Samuelson, Jenkins & Spencer) and vision science (An-
derson).
The papers
A number of themes can be discerned from the eleven
papers. Two papers discuss the implications of contempor-
ary theories of emergence for Marr’s tri-level hypothesis.
The Vrst, by Samuelson, Jenkins and Spencer, does so from
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the perspective of dynamic systems theory (speciVcally dy-
namic Veld theory), and argues that the view of cognition
and behaviour as the emergent outcome of the dynamic
interaction of multiple components over time proposed by
this approach provides a viable alternative to the traditional
Marrian conception of levels of analysis starting with the
computational level.
The second paper, by French and Thomas, identiVes dy-
namic interactions across levels—in particular the bottom-
up emergence of higher-level structures from lower level
components, and the subsequent interactions of these emer-
gent structures with the lower level components from
which they emerge—as a property missing fromMarr’s ana-
lysis that contemporary cognitive science must address and
explain.
Four papers discuss the relationship between theories at
diUerent levels of analysis, and in particular what consti-
tutes an appropriate strategy for connecting models at the
computational level with theories at lower levels. GriXths,
Lieder and Goodman suggest a top-down strategy which
starts by generating the abstract ideal model at the compu-
tational level and then identiVes models at the algorithmic
and representational level that approximate the ideal solu-
tion but which are constrained in terms of the resources
available.
In contrast, Love argues that the algorithmic and rep-
resentational level is the appropriate place to develop in-
tegrative theories to both the lower and higher levels. He
provides examples of such integration, drawing on research
in computational modeling and neuroimaging, and suggests
that the blurring of the boundaries between levels created
by these models may call into question the value of Marr’s
tripartite distinction. In a related vein, Cooper and Peebles,
argue that integrated cognitive architectures such as ACT-
R that provide strong, empirically grounded constraints on
rational theories and also have theoretical links with neural
level theories and data, are the essential bridge for linking
the algorithmic and representational level to the computa-
tional and implementational levels.
The fourth paper of this type, that by Gray Hardcastle
and Hardcastle, uses a case study – a neural model of the
cortico-striatal circuitry held to underlie impulsivity and
behavioral inhibition – to evaluate the strengths and weak-
nesses of each of Marr’s levels from the perspective of con-
temporary cognitive science. While they Vnd broad sup-
port for Marr’s approach, they also argue for some updat-
ing of it. First, they suggest that Marr’s computational level
should be extended to include a description of how the sys-
tem breaks down following neural damage. Second, they
emphasize that cognition is not a feed-forward process that
is disconnected from behavioral context and driven by the
transformation of representations (as the Marrian approach
assumes). This suggests greater interaction between levels
than might follow from a simplistic application of Marrian
analysis.
A third theme concerns the nature of speciVc levels, and
in particular the nature of the computational level. While
approaches to this level based on probability theory supple-
mented with Bayes’ theorem have been the focus of much
recent work (e.g., GriXths et al., 2008; Oaksford & Chater,
2007), this approach has itself also been a target of much re-
cent criticism (e.g., Bowers & C. J. Davis, 2012; Eberhardt
& Danks, 2011; Jones & Love, 2011; Marcus & E. Davis,
2013). Two papers in this topic take issue with Bayesian
accounts of the computational level. Anderson notes the
goal-directed nature of the computational level and criti-
cizes many contemporary (primarily Bayesian) accounts for
failing to distinguish between tasks shaped by natural se-
lection and evolutionary “by-products”. In contrast, Baggio,
van Lambalgen and Hagoort argue that propositional logic
provides a more satisfactory account of the computational
level than probability theory, linking accounts based on lo-
gic to other levels through behavioral and neural data.
Three papers present contrasting views on the question
of whether all three of Marr’s levels are necessary. Bickle
claims that advances in molecular biology and neuroscience
support reductionist explanations of cognitive functions
which eliminates the need for algorithmic and representa-
tional and computational explanations. In contrast, Bechtel
and Shagrir argue that each of Marr’s three levels makes
an important and non-redundant contribution to cognitive
explanation, particularly in understanding environmental
inWuences on cognitive mechanisms. Finally, Eliasmith
and Kolbeck argue that, contrary to some interpretations,
Marr sought to integrate his three levels, with each provid-
ing constraints on the others, and use their own work to
demonstrate the integration of high-level functional and de-
tailed mechanistic explanations.
This summary of themes does not do justice to the in-
tegrative nature of many of the contributions. For example,
Love also touches on this issue of the necessity (or other-
wise) of all levels, while Gray Hardcastle and Hardcastle
also consider relations between levels with their neural
model of cortico-striatal circuitry. However, it is clear from
the contributions that 30 years on many researchers still
consider that Marr’s levels are essential to cognitive sci-
entiVc explanation. That is, there remains broad agreement
that neither the computational level nor the implementa-
tion level (alone or in conjunction) can provide a full ac-
count of cognitive processes, and the algorithmic and rep-
resentational level remains essential to bridge between im-
plementation and function.
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